[Editorial] Samsung Strike: What the Government Should Pursue Is Institutional Reform
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Writer
CFE
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The labor dispute involving the Samsung Electronics union has been prolonged as the union demands the institutionalization of a bonus system equal to 15% of operating profit. During the post-mediation process at the National Labor Relations Commission, a conditional proposal was even put forward to grant a special bonus of 12% of operating profit, limited to the DS Division, if it achieved the world’s No. 1 position in both sales and operating profit. The union, however, rejected the proposal. This case once again reveals the chronic structural problems in Korean labor-management relations.
Operating profit is not cash on hand. It is the result of managerial judgment that must take into account research and development, capital investment, preparation for future risks, shareholder compensation, and the maintenance of the partner-company ecosystem. Demanding that a fixed percentage of it be earmarked as the source of performance bonuses effectively brings the company’s very right to dispose of its profits into the realm of labor-management bargaining. Performance bonuses exist because companies take risks, invest, and generate profits in the global market. No industry can remain sustainable under an asymmetrical structure in which companies and shareholders bear the losses while unions share the profits.
The National Labor Relations Commission’s draft review proposal for “12%” raises an even more serious issue. The role of a mediation body is to facilitate dialogue between labor and management and assist in reaching procedural agreement. The moment a public institution directly presents a numerical ratio for distributing operating profit, it is no longer mediation but intervention. Wages and performance bonuses should be determined comprehensively in light of a company’s productivity, investment plans, competitive environment, and financial condition. Administrative arbitration cannot replace managerial judgment.
The government’s indication that it may invoke emergency adjustment powers is also misguided. Emergency adjustment powers are an ultimate emergency measure that directly restricts the three basic labor rights. Even taking into account the national economic importance of the semiconductor industry, the more readily this tool is used in labor disputes at large corporations, the more the market will internalize the lesson that “the government resolves conflicts.” A practice will become entrenched in which the government solves problems that labor and management should resolve on their own, creating a precedent that justifies state intervention in every larger dispute that follows. The essence of the problem lies not simply in whether emergency adjustment powers are invoked, but in the structural imbalance of the system itself.
That imbalance is clear. In Korea, replacement workers are in principle prohibited during strikes. The right to strike is strongly protected, but companies have virtually no means of preventing production disruptions. In industries such as semiconductors, where production-line stoppages directly affect supply chains, exports, and the country’s overall credibility, the cost of this imbalance is especially high.
The solution is clear. First, restrictions on replacement workers during strikes should be eased so that companies can maintain at least minimal operations and protect their facilities. Second, the law must be enforced clearly against illegal workplace occupations and interference with production facilities. Third, the scope of the minimum service system should be expanded to protect core facilities and supply chains in national strategic industries. Fourth, public mediation bodies should move away from directly designing wage and performance-bonus levels and instead limit their role to procedural assistance.
The government has a different role to play. It must create the institutional foundation that allows labor and management to negotiate autonomously. If such disputes are not to be repeated, the system itself must be changed first. That is the task left by this situation, and the direction the government should take.
2026. 5. 20.
Center for Free Enterprise (CFE)
Original title: [논평] 삼성 파업, 정부가 노력할 것은 제도 개혁이다
Author: Center for Free Enterprise (CFE)
Date: 2026-05-20
Source: https://www.cfe.org/bbs/bbsDetail.php?cid=comment&pn=1&idx=28939
