An Economic Review of Introducing a Mandatory Tender Offer System
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Writer
CFE
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A mandatory tender offer rule is a system that imposes on a buyer of corporate control the obligation to additionally purchase shares held by minority shareholders within a certain range.
The basic purpose of the mandatory tender offer rule now being considered for adoption in Korea is to protect minority shareholders. However, the market rule, which allows the free transfer of controlling stakes, promotes efficient transfers of corporate control while also permitting inefficient transfers. The equal opportunity rule, which provides the theoretical basis for the mandatory tender offer rule, restrains inefficient transfers but may also hinder some efficient ones. The relative superiority of the two rules depends on how such characteristics as the managerial ability of the incumbent controlling shareholder and the new acquirer, and the private benefits of control, are distributed. In addition, in ownership structures where voting rights and cash-flow rights diverge, the effects of the mandatory tender offer rule may differ.
Theoretical research suggests that a mandatory tender offer rule may improve shareholder value, but there is insufficient empirical evidence to apply that effect to Korea. In particular, there is a lack of consistent estimates of the control premium for Korean firms. In addition, after the implementation of the EU Takeover Directive, takeover premiums declined in Spain and Finland, while no statistically significant change was found in Germany. However, these findings alone are insufficient to establish the independent causal effect of mandatory tender offer regulations.
Policy suggestion: Rather than rushing to legislate a mandatory tender offer rule, it is necessary to analyze Korea’s data on corporate control transactions and minority shareholder returns, and to assess the effectiveness of existing shareholder protection systems before deciding whether to adopt it.
I. Problem Identification and Criteria for Policy Evaluation
1. Discussion on Institutional Adoption
2. Criteria for Policy Evaluation
3. The Case for Caution
4. Key Concepts
II. The Theory of Corporate Control Transactions: Bebchuk’s Two Rules
1. Control Premium and Private Benefits of Control
2. The Basic Model of Bebchuk (1994)
3. Contrasting Results Under Identical Economic Conditions
4. The Relative Superiority of the Market Rule and the Equal Opportunity Rule
5. Two Forms of the EOR and the Difference from the Korean-Style Bill
III. The Interaction of Purchase Obligations, Transaction Methods, and Ownership Structure
1. Economic Differences Between Tender Offers and Negotiated Transactions
2. The Functions of Mandatory Tender Offers, Squeeze-Out Rights, and Appraisal Rights
3. Pyramid Ownership Structures and Dual-Class Shares
4. Acquisition Financing: Distinguishing Total Purchase Price from Net Social Cost
5. The Effects of Regulation Extend Not Only to Actual Acquisitions but Also to Potential Acquisitions
IV. Empirical Literature on the Value of Control
1. Estimates of the Value of Control by Country
2. Estimation Methods for the Value of Control and Their Interpretive Limitations
3. OECD (2025): Heterogeneity in Europe’s Mandatory Tender Offer Regimes
4. The Empirical Effects of the EU Takeover Directive: Alcalde-Fradejas and Pérez-Soba (2025)
V. Korea’s 50%+1 Share Approach: Distribution and Efficiency
1. The Structure of Korea’s Mandatory Tender Offer Rule
2. Toehold Acquisitions and the Probability of Sale by Ordinary Shareholders
3. Financing Burden
4. Incentives for Short-Term Trading and Long-Term Investment
5. Overlap with Existing Corporate Regulations
VI. Conclusion: Prudent Legislation Based on Empirical Verification
1. Assessing the Benefits and Costs of Institutional Adoption
2. Limitations of Overseas Empirical Studies and the Korean-Style System
3. Policy Suggestion
References
Original title: 의무공개매수제도 도입에 대한 경제학적 검토
Author: In-yeop Ji
Date: 2026-11-17
Source: https://www.cfe.org/bbs/bbsDetail.php?cid=report&pn=1&idx=29751
