The Liberal’s Performative Contradiction

Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who burst onto the scene like a comet in the late 1980s, sparked a major intellectual revolution that fundamentally transformed libertarianism. Having studied philosophy broadly for years under the renowned Marxist philosopher Jürgen Habermas, Hoppe is regarded as having greatly expanded the praxeological theoretical system of Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard on the basis of the rationalist philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Habermas. If the Austrian School, founded by Carl Menger, was transformed through Misesian praxeology into a complete a priori-deductive theoretical system, then one may summarize matters by saying that—at least up to now—Hoppe finally solidified the identity of the Austrian School as a kind of Theory of Everything encompassing epistemology, ethics, and economics by applying Mises’s methodology beyond economics to metaphysics and ethics as well. Considering the weight the Austrian School carries within libertarianism, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that Professor Hoppe is the most important living libertarian today.

Among Professor Hoppe’s many achievements, the one that has drawn the greatest attention is undoubtedly his Argumentation Ethics. This is the product of applying praxeology to ethics within the context of Habermas’s and Karl-Otto Apel’s discourse ethics and Neo-Kantianism in order to prove that libertarian ethical positions—including the defense of private property rights and natural rights—are logically irrefutable and absolute truths. Because Professor Hoppe’s intention is quite radical and uncompromising, much more verification and debate are needed as to whether argumentation ethics is truly valid. Even so, at least for now, it remains true that argumentation ethics is the most developed position in libertarian ethics. The single most crucial concept in argumentation ethics—and indeed in Hoppe’s system of thought as a whole—is the logical term “performative contradiction.” This refers to “a logical paradox in which the refuting claim implicitly acknowledges what it seeks to refute.”

For Professor Hoppe, the basic axiom of praxeology—“Human beings act by using means to attain ends”—is truly self-evident and an absolute truth that serves as the foundation of all knowledge. Therefore, every proposition that seeks to refute this axiom through performative contradiction contains a logical error. In other words, every claim that explicitly opposes praxeology, upon close examination, contains the self-contradiction of acknowledging the absolute validity of praxeology. Hoppe further argues that the only ethical position that does not stand in a relation of performative contradiction to the basic axiom of praxeology—at least among those developed so far—is precisely the libertarian ethics of Rothbard and himself.

Unfortunately, because Professor Hoppe is a non-mainstream scholar, academic efforts to test the validity of his claims have been relatively limited. Moreover, because he supports extreme rationalism and flatly rejects empiricism in the social sciences and metaphysics, he has many enemies. In effect, it is not unreasonable to say that he is taking on the entirety of contemporary philosophy and social science almost single-handedly. Taking this into account, no matter how strongly one sympathizes with Professor Hoppe, there is in fact a great burden in confidently claiming that his thought is truly an absolute truth transcending time and space.

Even setting aside the debate for and against Professor Hoppe, I wish here to argue that his approach, which emphasizes the importance of avoiding performative contradiction, is something libertarians must take seriously. Many people should be able to accept without much resistance Professor Hoppe’s view that one must maintain logical consistency thoroughly and avoid self-contradiction as much as possible. A consistent viewpoint grounded in strict standards is something anyone must pay close attention to if they hold convictions about sensitive fields such as politics and economics. In addition, when one takes into account the distinctive character of libertarianism, the need becomes even greater for those who call themselves libertarians to be free of performative contradiction.

If one were to investigate the precise definition of libertarianism academically, various disagreements would be possible. But expressed more simply at the level of everyday language, it could probably be summarized as “an ideology that pursues liberty.” Yet this is an extremely vague and confusing concept. Among the political ideologies of this world, there is none that explicitly opposes liberty. Even fascism and communism pursue liberty in their own way. The concept of liberty itself is also far from clear. When people speak of liberty, there is ample room for the specific meaning or nuance to differ. Some speak of political liberty, others of freedom from economic pressure, and still others of metaphysical liberty. Even within libertarianism itself, there are interpretive differences over whether liberalism or libertarianism is the more accurate expression.

Given this ambiguity in libertarianism, virtually anyone can claim to be a libertarian. To give just one striking example, in the various incidents over the past three years in Korea that seriously infringed upon individual liberty, many people who called themselves libertarians sided not with individual liberty but with state power. Likewise, the authoritarian regime from 30 to 40 years ago, which inflicted great harm on innocent citizens and actively led state intervention in the market, is also often highly praised by self-proclaimed libertarians.

From a commonsense standpoint, this kind of libertarianism is confusing and contradictory. In some areas, it strongly advocates individual liberty and private property rights, while in other areas, it gives greater priority to the authority of the state and community. As these contradictions pile up across different fields, libertarianism eventually comes to take shape as a giant melting-pot ideology, leading to the strange conclusion that someone claiming to be a libertarian shows little difference in viewpoint from a socialist or totalitarian. Can we truly recognize such a person as a libertarian?

Even if one defines libertarianism more deeply as “an ideology that pursues individual liberty and rights, with private property rights at the forefront,” there is in fact still no clear way to determine whether such a person is or is not a libertarian. From the perspective of utilitarianism, he may be a libertarian. But natural law theory tells us that he is by no means a libertarian. And if we take into account the naturalistic fallacy, we cannot definitively state which of these two positions is more valid.

In light of the dilemma described above, I believe the most appropriate definition of a libertarian is “a person who does not commit performative contradiction in pursuing liberty.” In other words, if one can refute the claims of a self-proclaimed libertarian using only his own logic, then there is reason to doubt whether he is truly “pursuing liberty.” In the example discussed above, “liberty-oriented conservative” would probably be a more appropriate label than “libertarian.”

The definition “a person who is free of self-contradiction in pursuing liberty” is not an especially harsh demand. It merely says that there is a need to clearly establish the meaning of the terms libertarianism and libertarian, which are used vaguely and confusingly. This is an essential task for better logical thinking and smoother communication. By using the presence or absence of self-contradiction as a diagnostic criterion, we can obtain an objective standard for judging who is and is not a libertarian. Moreover, libertarians themselves may discover an opportunity to examine and improve their own problems and errors.

Among the many logical fallacies, the one that causes the most serious problems is self-contradiction. Logic riddled with self-contradiction can never be trusted. This, in turn, shows that our common sense and rational inference are consistent with the claim that if someone advocates individual liberty on subject A, then a person who continues to advocate individual liberty on subject B as well—a person who does not append an “if” condition to the pursuit of liberty—meets the qualifications of a true libertarian.

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Original title: 자유주의자의 수행모순

Author: Kyeong-hun Kim

Date: 2019-10-31

Source: https://www.cfe.org/bbs/bbsDetail.php?cid=free_opinion&pn=17&idx=22009