Romance and Reality in Northeast Asian Peace

A country's foreign policy should be aimed at guaranteeing its sovereignty and advancing its national interest. And between those two goals, the one that must naturally take priority is the guarantee of sovereignty. Just as an individual without human rights cannot truly be an individual within society, a country without sovereignty cannot truly be a country within the international community. Advancing the national interest is a matter that comes afterward. That does not mean, of course, that advancing the national interest is unimportant. When sovereignty is secure, policies that promote the national interest are naturally necessary. A proper foreign policy is one that does not run counter to either of these two goals.

The Republic of Korea is a country whose sovereignty is diplomatically guaranteed. It is a member of the OECD, a member of the UN, has hosted global events such as the Olympics and the World Cup, and boasts an economy ranked among the world's top 10. But the Republic of Korea is also a country whose sovereignty can be threatened at any time. The Korean War has not yet formally ended, and China and Russia are constantly eyeing the Korean Peninsula. Until now, the Republic of Korea has deterred these risks through cooperation with Japan and the United States.

The Moon Jae-in administration's foreign policy feels quite different from this previous stance. It is trying to shake up the existing order in Northeast Asia. If the previous approach was to check China, Russia, and North Korea through the United States and Japan, then the picture envisioned by the Moon Jae-in administration is one in which, even at the cost of partially giving up relations with the United States and Japan, alternatives in the form of China and Russia are prepared, while at the same time permanently resolving the state of severed relations with North Korea.

For that reason, the Moon Jae-in administration currently appears to be conducting diplomacy with roughly two goals in mind. The first is to resolve, at least in the short term, the state of severed relations with North Korea. Of course, the broader goal is to resolve this state of estrangement permanently. The second is to settle historical issues with Japan, which is a secondary objective needed in service of the primary goal of ending the severed relationship with North Korea. It is intended to create the conditions for preparing China and Russia as alternatives for securing sovereignty in Northeast Asia, and to lay the foundation of Korea-Japan relations on the Korean Peninsula through the settlement of historical issues with Japan.

In fact, the Moon Jae-in administration's diplomacy appears to be proceeding much as it intended. With regard to the goal of resolving the severed relationship with North Korea, it made good use of the opportunity presented by the PyeongChang Olympics, which had been prepared under the previous administration, and even succeeded in helping bring about U.S.-North Korea dialogue. As for the goal of settling historical issues with Japan, it responded forcefully to Japan's removal of Korea from its whitelist of preferred trading partners by moving to terminate the military intelligence-sharing agreement concluded under the previous administration. If this continues, it will create circumstances in which the Korea-U.S.-Japan relationship is weakened to some degree and alternatives in the form of China and Russia must be put in place.

But there is something we must reconsider here. Are the Moon Jae-in administration's current objectives, and the means it is using to achieve them, appropriate as foreign policy? A country's foreign policy should aim first at guaranteeing sovereignty and second at advancing the national interest. If things were to unfold exactly as the Moon Jae-in administration envisions, it might achieve not only the first goal but even the second. But the way events are actually unfolding is not so favorable.

What a Continent-Oriented Foreign Policy Implies

A policy that weakens the Korea-U.S.-Japan relationship, which has been central to South Korea's security in Northeast Asia—that is, central to the guarantee of its sovereignty—and instead leans correspondingly on China and Russia as alternatives may sound desirable if it works as hoped, but in reality it is closer to a diplomatic gamble. First, China-Japan relations and Russia-Japan relations are not particularly good. They are strategic cooperative relationships, not relationships friendly enough to suggest a sufficient degree of mutual trust. In other words, they still fundamentally distrust one another. Nor are U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Russia relations in good shape. The United States and China are currently engaged in a trade war, and relations between the United States and Russia, like those between China and Japan and between Russia and Japan, are not marked by sufficient mutual trust.

For that reason, there is no guarantee that South Korea can maintain both the Korea-U.S.-Japan relationship and its relationships with China and Russia. For the Korean government, maintaining such a delicate balancing act would be extremely difficult, and even if the Moon Jae-in administration manages it well during its term, there is no guarantee that subsequent administrations will be equally successful. In that sense, the Northeast Asian order envisioned by the Moon Jae-in administration is an unstable equilibrium. It is closer to an unsustainable order. Of course, there would be no problem if all six countries with interests in the Northeast Asian order could improve relations with one another. But judging from the current Korea-Japan relationship, that does not seem easy. If South Korea and Japan cannot even coordinate their own interests, it is more accurate to say that aligning the interests of six countries according to South Korea's intentions is little more than a dream.

The Beginning of the Korea-Japan Crisis

Next, the path the current government is taking to settle historical issues with Japan, when one considers the costs that must be borne for it, is closer not to advancing the national interest but to giving it up. This is because it is engaging in a diplomatic confrontation with Japan while temporarily sacrificing the national economy. The whitelist was close to a kind of preferential treatment. Of course, it was a preferential measure provided on the premise that trust between Korea and Japan was solid. But because Japan removed Korea from the whitelist on the grounds that it could no longer trust Korea as a whitelist country, this was fundamentally a matter in which dialogue, not confrontation, should have come first.

But the Moon Jae-in administration used the incident as an opportunity to shake up the board. It advanced the justification that Japan had removed Korea from the whitelist in retaliation for the Korean Supreme Court's recognition of the forced labor victims' right to seek damages from Japanese wartime companies. According to this view, Japan's claim that trust had broken down because items that could be diverted for military use had been allowed to flow to North Korea was merely a surface-level pretext; Japan's true intent was economic retaliation against the Korean Supreme Court ruling and the Korean government's position. Treating the issue as a major matter, the administration also encouraged a boycott movement against Japan. And when Japan did not reverse the withdrawal of the preferential measure, the Moon Jae-in administration went so far as to terminate the military intelligence-sharing agreement. It has also continued a series of smaller retaliatory steps against Japan.

Even before asking whether a sovereign state may respond in this way, the fact is that the Moon Jae-in government's response is one that seeks to realize the administration's diplomatic objectives by sacrificing the private interests of individual Korean citizens, who are inevitably economically entangled with Japan. The response a sovereign state ought properly to make is limited to cases where that state's sovereignty has been infringed. In a situation like the present one, where trust between the two countries has broken down, at least on the surface, what is needed first is an active effort at dialogue. A response that turns first to confrontation before dialogue may be a response that a sovereign state can choose, but it is certainly not one that it must choose. In that sense, it constitutes an overreaction.

How Peace Is Achieved

There are several ways a country can seek to guarantee its sovereignty externally—in other words, several ways to achieve peace in external relations. Broadly speaking, there is the method of possessing overwhelming military strength, that is, pursuing an order based on power, and there is the method of ensuring that the other country's interests are satisfied under a condition of peace with one's own country, that is, pursuing an order based on shared interests. The former is in practice impossible today, because the world currently operates under an order sustained by the United States' overwhelming military power and economic strength. We already know well from North Korea's case that attempts at excessive military buildup invite UN economic sanctions.

That being the case, the only path available to South Korea is to pursue an order based on interests. That includes increasing the other country's economic dependence on South Korea, forming alliances with other countries, and becoming completely independent of other countries' interests. Of these, the third option is also impossible given South Korea's geopolitical characteristics. The Korean Peninsula is both a gateway to the continent and a gateway to the ocean. Historically, it was also a frontline of the Cold War. It is located in a position that cannot be detached from the interests of surrounding countries.

The methods that ultimately remain, then, are increasing other countries' economic dependence on South Korea and forming alliances with them. Forming alliances is the most reliable. After all, unless one is in an exceptional situation such as war, an alliance is essentially a confirmation of the mutual understanding and trust built up over time. But forming alliances is not without drawbacks. There is something that must be kept in mind: the other country must have a continuing incentive to remain in alliance with us. At present, the incentive the United States and Japan have for allying with South Korea is that South Korea is a useful means of checking the continental powers and the North Korean nuclear threat.

Finally, let us consider the method of increasing economic dependence. In the case of a country like China, it is difficult to make it economically dependent on South Korea. This is because its population is enormous, and its economy has now grown to a scale rivaling that of the United States. It is realistically impossible to make China economically dependent on South Korea. What, then, about Russia? Russia's population and economic scale are by no means small, but they are of a size at which some degree of dependence could be created. Its population is around 140 million, about three times that of South Korea's roughly 50 million. Its economy is also of almost the same scale as South Korea's, with GDP of approximately $1.5 trillion. It may take a long time, but it is not unrealistic.

The Path Korea Truly Should Take

South Korea, the United States, and Japan are already in a state of considerable economic integration. They are also in a military alliance relationship. In relations with China, it is more realistic to pursue a strategic cooperative relationship aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue than to try to increase dependence through economic exchange and cooperation. If that cannot be done, it would be better to give up on China. Deep economic integration between China and South Korea, given the difference in economic scale between the two, is likely to create a situation in which only South Korea has more to lose. In relations with Russia, by contrast, economic exchange and cooperation may be a realistic approach. The economies of South Korea and Russia are very similar in scale. If they become economically integrated, it is highly likely to lead to a situation in which each needs the other.

From this perspective, the Moon Jae-in administration needs to reflect on its foreign policy up to this point. Participating in China's Belt and Road Initiative may not, of course, harm either country, but it could create an imbalance in Korea-China relations. And trying to break out of the current Korea-Japan relationship may help with the objective of settling historical issues, but the cost that must be borne for that objective is considerable. Fundamentally, it means sacrificing the public for the sake of achieving diplomatic goals. It also carries some risk of breaking the peace maintained through the Korea-U.S.-Japan relationship. If today's Japan is seeking even firmer recognition of its status as a sovereign state, then in the worst case the Korea-Japan relationship could move away from the active cooperation seen until now. If the United States sees a Korea-Japan relationship that no longer coordinates, can it still place the same level of trust in South Korea as before? If South Korea is also looking seriously toward China and Russia as it is now, that becomes all the more doubtful.

The goal of resolving the severed relationship with North Korea also cannot be fully achieved if South Korea continues to play only the passive role of mediator in creating opportunities for U.S.-North Korea dialogue. The true first step toward ending the estrangement is for South and North Korea to recognize each other as states. If the aim is not to bring about North Korea's collapse and absorb it into the South, and if genuine peace between North and South is truly desired, then South Korea must recognize North Korea as a state and also induce North Korea to do the same toward the South. Only after that can the estrangement really be resolved—whether through formally declaring an end to the war and establishing friendly relations, or through increasing economic exchange and cooperation.

Korea's role as mediator should be an intermediate stage leading to the next step. If it is not, then under the current circumstances South Korea could be used and discarded as a tool for President Trump's reelection. That is all the more true in a situation like the present one, where South Korea is losing the trust of the United States. It is deeply worrying that the current administration seems so consumed by a romantic desire to stage dramatic moments.

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Original title: 동북아 평화에 관한 낭만과 현실

Author: Young-jun Kim

Date: 2019-09-02

Source: https://www.cfe.org/bbs/bbsDetail.php?cid=free_opinion&pn=18&idx=20470